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Background: India’s health expenditure is met mostly by households through out-of-pocket (OOP) payments at the
time of illness. To protect poor families, the Indian government launched a national health insurance scheme
(RSBY). Those below the national poverty line (BPL) are eligible to join the RSBY. The premium is heavily subsidised
by the government. The enrolled members receive a card and can avail of free hospitalisation care up to a
maximum of US$ 600 per family per year. The hospitals are reimbursed by the insurance companies. The objective
of our study was to analyse the extent to which RSBY contributes to universal health coverage by protecting
families from making OOP payments.
Methods: A two-stage stratified sampling technique was used to identify eligible BPL families in Patan district of
Gujarat, India. Initially, all 517 villages were listed and 78 were selected randomly. From each of these villages, 40
BPL households were randomly selected and a structured questionnaire was administered. Interviews and
discussions were also conducted among key stakeholders.
Results: Our sample contained 2,920 households who had enrolled in the RSBY; most were from the poorer
sections of society. The average hospital admission rate for the period 2010–2011 was 40/1,000 enrolled. Women,
elderly and those belonging to the lowest caste had a higher hospitalisation rate. Forty four per cent of patients
who had enrolled in RSBY and had used the RSBY card still faced OOP payments at the time of hospitalisation. The
median OOP payment for the above patients was US$ 80 (interquartile range, $16–$200) and was similar in both
government and private hospitals. Patients incurred OOP payments mainly because they were asked to purchase
medicines and diagnostics, though the same were included in the benefit package.
Conclusions: While the RSBY has managed to include the poor under its umbrella, it has provided only partial
financial coverage. Nearly 60% of insured and admitted patients made OOP payments. We plea for better
monitoring of the scheme and speculate that it is possible to enhance effective financial coverage of the RSBY if
the nodal agency at state level would strengthen its stewardship and oversight functions.
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India spends about 4.3% of its GDP on healthcare. How-
ever, 72% of this money is paid by individual households
through out-of-pocket payments (OOP) at the time of
illness, representing one of the highest proportions of
OOP in the world [1]; this results in financial barriers to
accessing healthcare. Evidence shows that in India about
6% of patients do not seek care for financial reasons [2];
for those who do seek care, the experience can be cata-
strophic and impoverishing. Berman et al. estimate that
more than 70 million Indians are impoverished every
year because of medical expenses [3].
The Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY) was
launched in April 2008, explicitly to protect the poor from
catastrophic hospital expenditure [4]. Under the leadership
of the federal Ministry of Labour and Employment, it pro-
vides protection for more than 30 million poor households
across the country against direct hospital expenses. All
poor households in the national below poverty line (BPL)
lista are eligible to enrol in this scheme; details on the
scheme’s design are provided in Figure 1. RSBY is a volun-
tary private health insurance scheme, wherein a BPL family
of (maximum) five people can enrol with an insurance
company by paying a token enrolment fee of US$ 0.6b per
family per year. Insurance companies enrol BPL families
and provide them with a RSBY “smart card” that contains
the biometric details of the enrolled family; the smart
card is necessary for all transactions at the hospital. The
premium for each family, which ranges from US$ 10 to
US$ 12, is paid by the government directly to the insurance
company. An enrolled patient can then seek care for any
major ailment that requires admission in empanelledFigure 1 The RSBY scheme.hospitalsc. Hospitals bill the insurance company based on
packages, a basic form of diagnostic related groups (DRG).
The insurance company reimburses the hospital up to a
maximum of US$ 600 per family per year. As most of the
1,000 DRG packages are within this upper limit, it is
expected that the majority of patients will walk out of the
hospital without paying any money at the time of illness.
This is expected to improve access to hospital care and
protect the family from impoverishment [5]. While the in-
surance company is responsible for implementing the
RSBY; oversight of this scheme is provided by the state
nodal agency.
Much has been written about the RSBY, especially re-
garding enrolment and some key operational issues [6-9].
From initial data, it appears that approximately 55% of
the poor have enrolled in the scheme, ranging from 11%
in the state of Assam to 87% in the state of Tripura. Low
enrolment was due to problems with the BPL list, inad-
equate information and knowledge dissemination to the
population, and technical glitches with the enrolment
process itself. The average hospitalisation rate was 26/
1,000 enrolled, ranging from 0.8/1,000 in Chandigarh to
52/1,000 in Kerala. This hospitalisation rate was above
the national average of 20 per 1,000 [2] and indicates that
the RSBY may have contributed in improving access to
hospital care in some states in India.
However, there are still many gaps in the understand-
ing about the workings of the RSBY, for example, not
much is known about the protective effect of RSBY on
OOP and impoverishment. Rathi et al. observe that there
are OOP expenses by RSBY patients both before and
after admission, but do not mention payments during
Table 1 Characteristics of families enrolled and patients






Living within 30 km of Patan town (%) 1245 (43%) 254 (49%)*
Lowest caste (%) 520 (18%) 118 (23%)*
With no land (%) 1914 (65%) 346 (67%)
Living in huts (%) 1172 (40%) 192 (37%)
With no sanitation (%) 2551 (87%) 436 (84%)
Families dependent on labour as the main
source of income (%)
2076 (72%) 382 (74%)
Families that consumed <3 meals/day (%) 1635 (56%) 283 (54%)
Families that have migrated in the last
year (%)
194 (7%) 54 (10%)
*The difference is statistically significant (P <0.05).
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studied the characteristics of the patients who were
hospitalised under the RSBY scheme and the extent to
which the scheme protected enrolled families from OOP
payments at the time of hospitalisation.
Methods
This study is part of a larger project measuring the con-
tribution of RSBY in achieving universal health coverage
in India. It was conducted in Patan district (Gujarat) in
2011; at the time of the study, only four districts in Gujarat
had completed two years of operations under the RSBY.
Among these four, Patan was chosen because it had aver-
age performance indicators with regards to RSBY, as well
as an average human development index (for Gujarat).
A cross-sectional household survey was conducted
among BPL households selected on a random, two stage
sampling basis. In the first stage, all villages in Patan dis-
trict (n = 517) were stratified according to the sub-
districts. Next, 15% of all villages in each sub-district
were sampled randomly, using probability proportionate
to size. Finally, from each of these 78 villages, 40 BPL
households were randomly selected. Each of these house-
holds was approached, and was administered a standard
structured questionnaire enquiring about household de-
tails, as well as details about enrolment and utilisation of
RSBY benefits during the period 2010–2011. Details of
their OOP expenditure both direct and indirect were also
recorded. Direct expenses included expenditure on medi-
cines, diagnostics, consultation fees and hospital charges;
while indirect expenses included expenses on food, travel
and informal fees. Direct expenses could be incurred either
before or after the hospitalisation or during the hospital
stay. In this article, we have focussed on direct expenses
during the hospitalisation episode as this is the expense
that RSBY is expected to cover.
Missing households were replaced with the next house-
hold in the list until a total of 40 households was reached
in each village. If a village did not have 40 BPL households,
the adjacent village was included in the cluster and the
remaining households were selected from this village.
Other than this, in-depth interviews and focus group dis-
cussions were held with key stakeholders like community
members (n = 14), district and state officers (n = 6), as well
as providers (n = 6) till saturation was achieved (providers
that saw more RSBY patients were included in the above
sample). All interviews were conducted by experienced in-
terviewers in the local language; detailed notes were made
and analysed manually. Ethical clearance for this study was
obtained both from the WHO ethical review board as well
as from the Ethical Committee of the Institute of Public
Health (IPH) in Bangalore.
In this document, we present only the findings relevant
to utilisation of RSBY benefits, specifically hospitalisationand OOP payments at the time of hospitalisation. All
financial data is presented as median with interquartile
range.
Results
Among the 3,120 sampled households, 2,920 BPL fam-
ilies in total had enrolled in the RSBY scheme during the
period 2010–2011. The median family size was 5.5 and
48.6% of the household members were females. There
were 16,368 individuals in these families, but the num-
ber of individuals enrolled was 13,087. The median age
of the enrolled individuals was 21 years with 36% of the
population being below 15. The majority of the families
(2,866 out of 2,920) surveyed were Hindus; 78% of the
families were from a backward caste and 18% belonged
to the lowest caste (SC). Only 1.2% of the surveyed fam-
ilies belonged to aboriginal groups (ST). There was a
relatively even distribution of enrolled families in terms
of distance from Patan town. Table 1 provides more de-
tails on socio-economic characteristics of the families
studied and individuals hospitalised.
Among the enrolled individuals, there was a total
of 520 hospitalisation episodes corresponding to an
admission rate of 40 admissions per 1,000 enrolled individ-
uals. The common reasons for admission were pregnancy
related (n = 96) followed by hysterectomies (n = 58), injur-
ies (n = 53) and cardio-vascular related diseases (n = 51).
Patients went mostly to private hospitals (73%), and
93% of all patients were satisfied with the treatment
received. The 520 patients were admitted in 166 dis-
tinct hospitals distributed equally between the district
and sub-district levels. The majority of hospitals (105)
had admitted just one RSBY patient during the period
2010–2011, and only eight hospitals had admitted more
than 10 patients. While most patients were admitted in
empanelled hospitals, 30% of the patients were not aware
Table 2 Out-of-pocket expenditures among patients
enrolled under RSBY in Patan district, 2010–2011
Number of patients who had





180 (35%) US$ 0 (0, 40)
Direct expenses
during admission
299 (58%) US$ 100 (46, 240)
Direct expenses
after discharge
216 (42%) US$ 7 (0, 40)
Indirect expenses 489 (94%) US$ 18 (8, 40)
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were admitted.
Of the 520 hospitalised, nearly half lived within 30 km
of Patan town. Hospitalisation rates fell steadily with dis-
tance (Figure 2), and the admission rates for those who
lived more than 30 km from the town was significantly
lower than admission rates for those who lived within
30 km (χ2 = 9.246, P = 0.0023).
There was no difference in admissions between various
religious groups, but patients who belonged to SC seem
to have a higher admission rate (42/1,000 SC enrolled)
compared to other castes (χ2 = 11.75, P = 0.0006). The
ST population, who is the most vulnerable, had the lowest
admission rate of 22/1,000 ST enrolled. More women
(57%) used hospital services than men (43%) and this dif-
ference was statistically significant (χ2 = 15.429, P = 0.000).
Admission rates were higher among adults and elderly
compared to children and adolescents. One possible ex-
planation for the low admissions among children was the
tendency among parents to use other free government
schemes for children and preserve the RSBY benefits for
the adults; some informants stated this to be the case dur-
ing the interviews. There was no difference in admission
rates between the different income groups among the en-
rolled individuals.
Of the 520 admissions, only 13 (3%) did not have to
pay any money for their hospitalisation. The rest in-
curred a median expense of US$ 141 ( range, $48–$343),
either before, during or after admission (Table 2). As the
RSBY scheme is expected to protect the patient from
direct expenses during hospitalisation, we investigated
this in further detail. More than half of the admitted pa-
tients had made OOP payments to receive the appropri-
ate care at the time of hospitalisation. This ranged from
less than a dollar to more than US$ 500 in the case of
20 patients (Figure 3). The families who made OOP pay-
ments tended to live further away and were poorer com-
pared to those who did not make OOP payments














































Admission rate Upper Lower Odds Ratio
Figure 2 Admission rates by distance and the probability of
admission by distance groups.without OOP, used the private sector and were admitted
mainly for delivery and hysterectomy. The median OOP
payment in both private and government hospitals was
US$ 100 (range, $46–$240).
Despite being enrolled in the RSBY, 58% of patients
(299 out of 520) still made OOP payments at the time of
hospitalisation. Our survey indicates that of the 299 pa-
tients who incurred OOP, 174 patients had used the
RSBY card for hospitalisation. Despite having a RSBY
card, the hospitals still collected money from 124 patients
at the time of hospitalisation (Figure 4). A possible ex-
planation for this is the alleged ‘low’ prices of the DRG
packages in empaneled hospitals, especially for non-
surgical cases. Doctors admitted that they had stopped
seeing RSBY patients with non-surgical conditions as it
was ‘not remunerative’. Yet another reason mentioned by
doctors were the delays and uncertainty of payment by
the insurance companies. Hospitals, therefore, tended to
ask for advances from patients, make them buy medi-
cines and consumables and sometimes even pay the en-
tire bill, with the promise to return the same when the
insurance company reimburses the hospital. Another fifty
patients did not receive free care because of problems ei-
ther with the card (n = 30) or with the card reader at the
hospital (n = 20). Patients mentioned that even a small
spelling error on the card or a minor difference in age
was reason enough for the hospital to refuse free treat-
ment. Many times patients were asked to supplement the
RSBY smart card with additional documents like ration
card, BPL card, voter’s identity card, etc. Even the insur-
ance companies insisted on documents from the hospi-
tals, such as case sheets, patient identification details, etc.
A hospital administrator said “RSBY is a paperless
scheme, only on paper.”
The doctors justify taking money from patients by citing
examples about how insurance companies delay or even
refuse reimbursements on flimsy grounds. “Everything
matches, the name, the thumbprint, the address, the family
details, but the gender may be wrongly entered in the card.
That is enough for the insurance company to refuse our
claim”. As another hospital administrator stated “In-




















Total expenditure During hospitalisation
Figure 3 Out-of-pocket expenditure by hospitalised patients in Patan district (2010–2011).
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ments, 14 had not received the RSBY card even though
they had enrolled in the scheme. About 35 patients were
admitted to an un-empanelled hospital. Most of the fam-
ilies interviewed stated that they never received any list of
empanelled hospitals at the time of enrolment.
Unfortunately, some patients did not use the card be-
cause they did not know about it (n = 46), or forgot to
use it (n = 23). Interviews show that while the insurance
company launched intensive awareness campaigns, most
of the messages were limited to “what” the scheme is
and “who” is eligible; there was remarkably little infor-
mation about “how” to use the card and to benefit from
the scheme. Therefore, we had a situation where many
patients sought healthcare and made OOP payments,
even though they had a RSBY card in their house. They
were simply not aware that they could use this card to
get free hospitalisation care.
Discussion
Our study shows that access to hospital care has in-




Patients belonging to families that live within 30 km of Patan town 130
Patients belonging to lowest caste (%) 64 (2
Patients belonging to landless families (%) 203
Patients who live in huts (%) 133
Patients belonging to families where labour is the main source of
income (%)
231
Patients belonging to families that ate <3 meals a day (%) 175
Patients that used private hospitals 229make OOP payments even though they were insured. The
fact that the admission rate among those enrolled in the
RSBY scheme was as high as 40/1,000 enrolled is a positive
finding. The National Sample Survey study showed that
admission rate was 29/1,000 people in Gujarat and ranged
from 18 to 32 per 1,000 population for the poorest in India
[2]. It is also gratifying to see that the vulnerable (women,
SC and elderly) have benefited from the scheme. What is
worrying, however, is the fact that the most vulnerable
population, the aboriginal groups, lag behind in utilisation
of benefits. It is also problematic that most of those who
received the cards and who benefited from it live close to
Patan town. A likely explanation is that the travel cost for
those living far away forms a significant barrier to utilising
hospital services. The state nodal agency would need to
monitor this closely to ensure that those living far from the
district headquarters also benefit from the RSBY.
In order to increase the people’s financial coverage, the
organisers of the scheme need to ensure that patients are
protected from making OOP payments. Measures could
include increasing awareness about the card and its use,
about the rights of RSBY enrolees, and information aboutyment
nts who made OOP payments
e time of admission
Patients who did not make OOP









Figure 4 Reasons for patients making out-of-pocket payments at the time of admission.
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need to prevent providers from collecting money from
both the patient as well as the insurance company. The fact
that nearly 60% of insured patients had to spend about
10% of their annual incomed on hospital expenses, despite
being enrolled, is problematic. Enrolment in the scheme
and utilisation of the RSBY card are merely intermediate
steps in a process of having cashless benefits that protects
the families from OOP payments. If this objective is not
met, then the entire purpose of the scheme is jeopardised.
In a 2011 report, Palacios mentions that RSBY patients are
being asked to purchase medicines from outside the hos-
pital [5]; our own study clearly shows that OOP payments
are a major source of concern and may eventually under-
mine the credibility of the scheme. Unfortunately, we could
not get the insurance companies’ views on this important
matter, which is an obvious limitation of our study.
In the current design of the scheme, the insurance
company is the main implementer of the RSBY scheme.
It enrols members, empanels hospitals, processes claims
and reimburses hospitals. There is, however, no incen-
tive for them to monitor OOP payments and minimise
them. Hospitals that force RSBY patients to buy medi-
cines and pay hospital bills are paid twice: first by the
patient, second by the insurance company. Patients areoften not in a position to negotiate as they are vulnerable
at the time of admission. A major responsibility for the
state nodal agency would be to prevent hospitals from
charging RSBY patients, which implies close monitoring
and taking necessary action when appropriate. Possible
suggestions would be to operate a round-the-clock helpline
that patients can call or to randomly make calls to patients
discharged from hospitals to find out whether they had
made OOP payments or to systematically sample patients
and find out which hospitals are indulging in this fraudu-
lent activity. It is of course important that hospitals are re-
imbursed adequately and promptly so that they do not
have to ask patients to pay.
Related to this is the fact that 520 patients have sought
care in 166 different hospitals. This dilutes the negoti-
ation power of the insurance company with regards to
hospitals. While there is a drive to empanel as many
hospitals as possible in order to enhance people’s geo-
graphical access to hospital care, one also needs to bal-
ance this with the need to empanel hospitals that
provide quality care and that are properly managed. If
insurance companies would empanel fewer hospitals
that are well distributed geographically across the dis-
tricts, they could negotiate with these hospitals and
purchase a better quality of care for the RSBY enrolees
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be explored.
Finally, from a universal health coverage perspective,
RSBY only targets people estimated to be poor (about
30% to 40% of the population). Of these, only 50% to
60% are currently enrolled [12], thereby reducing the
population coverage even further. When it comes to ser-
vice coverage, hospitalisations are only a part of the en-
tire health package. Service coverage is also limited
because of an upper limit of only US$ 600. The main
(and unexpected) finding of our study is the poor finan-
cial coverage by the RSBY. It was generally thought that
even though population and service coverage are still
low, financial coverage would be high. Our study, how-
ever, shows that more than 40% of insured patientse who
had used the RSBY card had to pay money at the time of
hospitalisation; pre-hospitalisation expenses and indirect
expenses would reduce financial coverage even further.
While attempts by the RSBY to expand the population
and service coverage are laudable [13], it is important
and urgent for the RSBY organisers to ensure appropri-
ate financial coverage.
Conclusions
The RSBY has improved access to hospital care even for
the vulnerable population groups. While many patients
did not have to pay at all for their hospitalisation, others
had to pay for medicines and diagnostics. This issue
needs to be addressed urgently if the RSBY is to main-
tain its credibility and relevance. We recommend that
state nodal agencies are strengthened to provide the ne-
cessary supervision and regulation of the scheme. These
agencies could and should play a more prominent role
in ensuring that the enrolment process is inclusive, that
benefits actually reach the poor and that there is no
abuse of the system. Insurance companies need to be
more proactive in strategically purchasing care from
hospitals and ensuring that the providers adhere to the
contract. Finally, higher awareness among the popula-
tion about the RSBY scheme and their rights as enrolees
needs to be ensured.
Endnotes
aThe poverty line is calculated by the Planning Commis-
sion based on household consumer expenditure as col-
lected by the National Sample Survey Organisation every
five years. Poverty lines are anchored to a calorie intake
norm (2,400 calories per person per day in rural areas and
2,100 calories per person per day in urban areas). The list
of BPL used by the RSBY was calculated in 2002. For fur-
ther details, kindly refer to the following document. Rath
N: Measurement of Poverty: In retrospect and prospect.
Economic and Political Weekly, 2011, 46:40–43.
bExchange rate used is US$ 1 = INR 50.cAny private or government hospital with more than
10 beds and with an allopathic doctor is eligible to be
empaneled. The insurance company is responsible for
empanelling the hospitals. All empanelled hospitals are
expected to have a smart card reader and a computer
that is connected in real-time to the main RSBY server.
dAs per the Planning Commission submission, an indi-
vidual earning less than Rs 781 per month is below the
poverty line [Mahapatra D, Sethi N: Spend Rs 32 a day?
Government says you can’t be poor. Times of India,
2011: Sept 21]. Extrapolating for a family of five, this
means that any family earning less than US$ 937 per
annum is below the poverty line. The median OOP of
US$ 100 is roughly 10% of this annual income.
eOf 520 patients, 125 did not use the RSBY card due
to various reasons. Of the remaining 395 insured pa-
tients who used the card, 174 (44%) had to make pay-
ments at the time of hospitalization.
Abbreviations
BPL: Below poverty line; DRG: Diagnostic related groups; OOP: Out-of-pocket;
RSBY: National health insurance scheme; SC: Scheduled caste; ST: Scheduled
tribe.
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